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ABSTRACT
The main thesis of this paper is that a large part of human behavior cannot be understood 
in terms of natural kinds but by appealing to normative kinds. In the first section we explain 
the distinction between  natural kinds and  normative kinds. In the second section we focus 
on the notion of “human behavior”, proposing a distinction between type A and type B 
behaviors and pointing out that psychology deals with type B behaviors, which are also 
included as diagnostic criteria for mental disorders. In the third section we analyze the strat-
egies used in biomedical research to find specific etiologies (“essences”) in order to explain 
such disorders. We argue that their results are inconsistent and that the lack of biomarkers 
that are clinically useful to refine the diagnoses is due to the fact that, unlike certain neuro-
pathologies, there are no physiological essences behind such disorders. On the other hand, 
we argue that, as we are dealing with type B behaviors, we must interpret mental disorders 
as normative kinds.
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RESUMO
A tese principal deste artigo é que uma grande parte do comportamento humano não 
pode ser entendida em termos de tipos naturais, mas deve recorrer a tipos normativos. Na 
primeira seção, explicamos a distinção entre tipos naturais e tipos normativos. Na segunda 
seção, ressaltamos a noção de “comportamento humano”, propondo uma distinção entre 
comportamentos do tipo A e tipo B e salientando que a psicologia lida com comportamen-
tos do tipo B, que também são incluídos como critérios de diagnóstico para transtornos 
mentais. Na terceira seção, analisamos as estratégias utilizadas na pesquisa biomédica, a 
fim de encontrar etiologias específicas (“essências”) para explicar esses transtornos. Argu-
mentamos que seus resultados são inconsistentes e que a falta de biomarcadores clinica-
mente úteis para refinar os diagnósticos se deve ao fato de que, diferentemente de certas 
neuropatologias, não existem essências fisiológicas por trás desses transtornos. Por outro 
lado, argumentamos que, ao lidarmos com comportamentos do tipo B, devemos interpre-
tar os transtornos mentais como tipos normativos.
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Introduction
The idea that some of the conceptual tools we deploy 
cut out the world “by its joints” – i.e. they refer to natural 
kinds – is an idea implicit in our everyday conception of 
the world and also a guide for scientific research. The sci-
entific knowledge thus acquired affects our daily life, as 
we appeal to scientific information to make decisions both 
individually and socially. The advances of modern science 
in certain areas (especially in chemistry and biology) and 
the improvement in our everyday lives due to this knowl-
edge are paradigmatic cases of the success provided by the 
assumption that the world contains natural kinds whose 
essence is accessible to us through scientific research. And 
it encourages us to extend the idea of natural kind to other 
scientific fields. In the case of medically relevant biologi-
cal categories we have discovered the “essences” of many 
of our everyday categories (e.g., mainly diseases, such as 
measles, tuberculosis, dengue, etc.). These essences are 
the hidden mechanisms behind the superficial similarities 
that we observe and use as evidence of the existence of 
a natural kind. Not all the categorizations we elaborate 
involve natural kinds, because not all the similarities we 
observe can be explained by deeper unobservable mech-
anisms. But, in any case, as cognitive psychologists found 
(Keil, 1989; Medin, 1989; Murphy, 2000) following 
Quine’s 1967 philosophical intuition, we are cognitively 
biased towards looking for the hidden mechanisms behind 
superficial similarities we find. 
When it comes to social sciences and humanistic dis-
ciplines, the idea of  natural kind seems inappropriate. Many 
authors contrast natural kinds with other types of catego-
ries, such as human or interact ive kinds (Hacking, 1991b, 
1995), human-made kinds (Ereshefsky, 2004), normative 
kinds (Griffiths, 2004), pract ical kinds (Zachar, 2000), his-
torical kinds (Bach, 2012), objective types (Haslanger, 2012) 
or social kinds (Mason, 2016), in order to mark a difference 
between the taxonomies used in natural sciences and other 
kinds of categorization pract ices.
Human behavior is the object of study of a particular sci-
ence: psychology3, that seems to be half a way between these 
two kinds of scientific disciplines. For almost two centuries, 
psychology has sought to find a place in the concert of other 
sciences, assuming – either explicitly or implicitly – ideas that 
have been successful in other fields: in this paper we want to 
focus on the idea of  “natural kind”. The question that guides 
this work is whether it is possible to adopt the idea of  natural 
kind when dealing with psychological categories that involve 
human behavior.4 In order to understand human behavior in 
our everyday life, we appeal to mental concepts5 constituting 
a network that is usually called folk psychology.6 The most 
basic folk-psychological categories are transcultural: basic 
emotions (such as fear, disgust, joy, sadness, etc.), desire, belief, 
bodily sensations (such as pain, itch), memory, learning. Be-
sides the discussion about whether these concepts are innate 
or not and whether they constitute a theory or not, in our 
daily lives we use them to understand and explain the act ions 
of our fellow humans. On the other hand, throughout their 
history, the psychological sciences added a set of technical 
concepts that are part of the scientific theories that seek to 
explain human behaviors. Some examples of technical terms 
historically coined in various scientific theories are: “Oedipus 
complex”, “autism”, “neurosis”, “hysteria”, “working memory”,7 
“Alzheimer’s disease”, “Attention Deficit Hyperact ivity Disor-
der (ADHD)”. 
The thesis that we are going to defend in this paper is 
that a large part of human behavior cannot be understood 
in terms of natural kinds but by appealing to normative 
kinds. The plan of this paper is as follows. In the first sec-
tion we will explain the distinction between  natural kinds 
and  normative kinds. In the second section we will focus 
on the notion of “human behavior”, showing the diversity 
of types of behaviors and drawing a distinction between 
type A (involuntary bodily changes) and type B (inten-
tional movements) behaviors; pointing out that psychology 
seems to be dealing with type B behaviors, which are also 
included as diagnostic criteria for mental disorders. In the 
third section we will analyze the strategies that are used in 
biomedical research in order to find sp ecific etiologies (“es-
sences”) which would explain such disorders. We will argue 
that their results are inconclusive and that the absence of 
biomarkers that are clinically useful to refine the diagnoses 
responds to the fact that, unlike the case of certain neu-
ropathologies, there are no biological essences behind such 
disorders. On the other hand, we will argue that, as we are 
dealing with type B behaviors, we must interpret mental 
disorders as normative kinds. 
3 We are including under the label “psychology” both normal and abnormal/pathological behaviors; hence, we are including psychiatry 
as part of psychology.
4 In fact, all social sciences and humanistic disciplines are concerned with human behavior. While there is some bibliography about the 
notion of natural kind in sociology, gender studies, etc., there are not many works that consider this idea specifically regarding cate-
gorizations in psychology. In general, as we shall see, it is assumed that psychology is a natural science and that therefore it deals with 
natural kinds, whose essences are biological; however, recently this orthodox view has begun to be put into doubt, as we will see in the 
next paragraph.
5 We will use the expressions “mental concepts” and “psychological concepts” indistinctly.
6 Lewis, 1972, p. 212; Fodor, 1987, Goldman, 1993, p. 15; Hutto, 2008, p. ix.
7 In some cases, some folk-psychological concepts such as “memory” are redefined or divided into sub-species such as “working mem-
ory”, “long term memory”, “episodic memory”, etc.
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1 Natural kinds and 
normative kinds
We classify the things around us in order to guide our ac-
tions in the world. We categorize things as being “of the same 
type” insofar as dealing with that set of things is simplified 
thanks to such categorization, because the things belonging to 
that category correspond in the same way to our interests and 
pract ical purposes. Very often we classify things as being of 
the same type because we think that they all have something 
in common that allows us to predict their behavior by study-
ing some of them and projecting our knowledge onto similar 
objects. This is the idea of a “natural kind”. Paradigmatical-
ly, modern science aims at increasing knowledge though re-
search on natural kinds. This strategy has brought enormous 
benefits to humanity. Thus, modern science has managed to 
increase its predictive ability by refining ordinary categories 
and finding new forms of categorization that sometimes co-
incide,8 sometimes divide9 and sometimes come into conflict 
with our ordinary concepts.10 Natural sciences aim to find 
the mechanisms that unify each natural kind, mechanisms 
that are understood as the hidden essences that allow us to 
explain the superficial features and behaviors of the objects 
that belong to a certain kind. In paradigmatic cases, these es-
sences are described by some scientific discipline involving 
new concepts. A paradigmatic example of a natural kind is 
“water”, whose essence – H
2
O – was est ablished with the de-
velopment of chemistry in the eighteenth century; another 
example is tuberculosis, whose “essence” is given by the pres-
ence of Koch’s bacillus in the organism.
According to Putnam (1975), natural kind concepts 
consist of at least two components: an essence and a stereo-
type. The stereotype is the set of superficial, observable fea-
tures that every competent sp eaker – or, alternatively, every-
one who has mastery of the concept – knows; it allows us to 
rightly apply the term to the objects in the world. In the case 
of “water”, this stereotype will include that: it is a tasteless, 
colorless, odorless liquid; it quenches thirst; we can find it in 
lakes, rivers, seas and oceans; it freezes at 0 degrees Celsius 
and boils at 100 degrees (always at sea level), etc. This set of 
traits is usually presented as a whole in nature, and they are 
the ones that we seek to explain through scientific research, 
finding an essence which unifies these features.
The essence, therefore, is what we aim to discover 
through empirical research, in order to explain the superfi-
cial observational features of a given kind. Putnam defended 
a realistic reading of these essences, but the notion of natu-
ral kind can also be adopted from a non-essentialist position. 
According to a non-essentialist view – developed, among 
others, by Boyd (1991) and Hacking (1991a) – when we are 
in the presence of clusters of properties that regularly appear 
together, we tend to look for deeper, unobservable causes, and 
to propose new (scientific) redescriptions of the phenome-
na in order to account for what is behind and unifies those 
observable features. According to this non-essentialist view, 
this hunger for deeper explanations is a charact eristic of our 
cognitive apparatus, without compromising with the idea that 
reality actually has any “joints” to be found. In what follows 
we will remain neutral about this metaphysical question, as 
it is enough for us to assume that these natural kind concepts 
include a set of prototypical, superficial, observable features 
that we think need deeper cohesion and that natural science 
has the responsibility to find the deep explanatory nature of 
these clusters of properties. Thus, we will only be concerned 
with the cognitive bias that led us (individually and as mem-
bers of the scientific community) to look for deeper explana-
tions of observable phenomena. We will use the expression 
“essence” (in quotation marks) to emphasize this hunger for 
an explanation couched in terms belonging to more basic 
levels, and “stereotype” to refer to the cluster of observable, 
superficial, phenomenological properties that natural science 
seeks to explain. It is important to remark that in the course 
of scientific development we can find divided “essences” for a 
given stereotype (like in the case of jade), or we can be urged 
to exclude certain objects from the extension of a natural 
kind term, even if the stereotype is present, because it does 
not have the proper “essence” (for example, whales from the 
kind fish), or we can even be led to modify or refine the ste-
reotype. In sum, some objects could be excluded from a cat-
egory because of a scientific discovery about the nature of its 
“essence” and also the stereotype of a natural kind can change 
when an “essence” is scientifically determined; typically, in the 
case of medical terms, the “essence” will determine new ele-
ments of the stereotype, i.e. of the diagnostic criteria for the 
disease (including, for example, the result of blood tests in the 
proper diagnosis of certain diseases).
In the case of psychology, mental concepts have a “ste-
reotype” that includes human behavior. It is not necessary to 
be a behaviorist to realize that it is imperative to include open 
behaviors among the evidence we must consider when deal-
ing with mental concepts. Thus, leaving aside for a moment 
the question of the reference of concepts such as “pain”, “belief ”, 
“fear” or “attention”, it seems clear that in order to use these 
concepts appropriately and apply them to our fellows, we must 
take into account the observable (linguistic and non-linguistic) 
behavior that they display. Within orthodox functionalism – 
which is predominant in cognitive sciences, including cogni-
8 For example, water = H
2
O.
9 This is the case of jade, which has now a divided reference (“jadeite” and “nephrite”) because there are two different chemical struc-
tures behind what we phenomenologically identify as jade.
10 For example, whales were considered big fishes, because they look phenomenologically alike to fishes, but now we learned that they 
belong to a mammal clade (assuming that clades are the essences of species; see Dupré, 1993 for a discussion about this topic).
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tive neurosciences – psychological concepts refer to internal 
states of the individual that have a causal effect on behavior 
and are detectable by their effects (under normal conditions, 
i.e. in everyday life, and also in scientific experiments). But 
we also attempt to access these internal states by other more 
direct means when we “open the black box” and look for the 
neural correlates of these internal states; neurological states 
that supposedly constitute the neurophysiological “essence” of 
mental states. In parallel with the case of water, some scientists 
(particularly the cognitive neurosciences) assume that pain, 
belief, fear, attention and all the other mental concepts have 
their associated stereotype, including the prototypical behav-
iors caused by these mental states, and a biological essence that 
can be known via (neuro)scientific research.
Griffiths (1997) was the first to cast doubt over whether 
a subset of these psychological concepts (the concept “emo-
tion” and the concepts corresponding to particular emotions 
such as “fear”, “love”, etc.) could be considered natural kind 
concepts. In asking this question, Griffiths took for granted 
that in order to give an affirmative answer it was necessary 
to find through empirical research an “essence” that stood 
behind those concepts, that is, a “nature” that unifies the 
phenomena in question. Griffiths held that “emotion” is not 
a natural kind because it would be impossible to find a sin-
gle “essence” for all of the different emotions (he argued that 
some of them would be better explained by biology, while 
others would be better explained by the social sciences). But 
he also argued that basic Darwinian emotions (fear, disgust, 
anger, joy, sadness and surprise) are in fact natural kinds in so 
far as biology had located an essence for them: a neurophysi-
ological “affective program”.11 
There has also been interest in posing a similar question 
about other types of psychological concepts: those we use to 
name psychiatric disorders. Hacking (1991b) considers the 
example of the concept “child abuse”, which seems to be a key 
notion in the diagnosis of multiple personality disorders, and 
shows how this concept varied both in extension and inten-
sion in the last half century, noting that those changes were 
not linked to an increase in knowledge of a certain phenom-
enon through the natural sciences, but due to changes in the 
cultural and social norms that est ablish which set of pract ices 
were acceptable in a society and which were not. Thus, this 
is an example of what Griffiths (2004) called a “normative 
type”. His idea is to highlight that what is behind the phenom-
enological observable properties of certain kinds may well be 
normative types, that is, normative pract ices that a society has 
imposed on itself in the course of its history.
As we said above, there are several authors who con-
trast natural kinds with other types or kinds, such as human 
or interact ive kinds (Hacking, 1991b, 1995), human-made 
kinds (Ereshefsky, 2004), normative kinds (Griffiths, 2004), 
historical kinds (Bach, 2012), objective types (Haslanger, 
2012), pract ical kinds (Zachar, 2000), or social kinds (Mason, 
2016), to mark the difference between the sciences concerned 
with human behavior and the natural sciences. In this paper 
we propose to use the category of “normative kind” to include 
all those categories that involve normative standards behind 
their stereotypical features.12 In the next section we will say 
more about them.
As an example of a normative kind we can consider 
ADHD, which is very frequently diagnosed in school-age 
children. The diagnostic criteria used in this case involve the 
child’s behavior and the diagnosis is exclusively based on the 
evaluation that adults (teachers, parents, etc.) perform on the 
child’s behaviors, indicating what her achievements are, which 
act ivities she is able do and which she cannot, how good she 
is in doing her tasks compared with the average of other chil-
dren of the same age, etc. We can contrast this situation with 
usual physical diseases and with the diagnostic criteria used 
when we need to diagnose them. Consider, for example, the 
case of dengue. In this case we have a set of symptoms such as 
high fever, headaches, vomiting, muscle and joint pains, and a 
charact eristic skin rash, which leads the physician to ask for 
a blood test in order to find the antibodies to the dengue vi-
rus or its RNA (the “essence”) that produces the symptoms. 
The final diagnosis depends upon the result of the blood test. 
As Griffiths (2004) points out, the diagnosis of ADHD al-
lows educators, parents and psychiatrists to single out behav-
iors or a behavioral style that is unacceptable to the teachers 
and the educational institutions to which the child belongs. 
But by treating these concepts as “natural kinds” we are as-
suming that there is a scientific discipline that is responsible 
for explaining and understanding these phenomena, autho-
rizing the agents involved in the case to perform certain prac-
tices, such as medicating the child, and carrying out various 
types of therapies. The question about the biological essence 
of ADHD is still an open question, but in our opinion there 
are solid reasons to believe that the search for biological “es-
sences” in normative kinds such as this is hopeless, as we will 
argue analyzing in detail another example in #3. 
11 Elster (1999) argues against the idea of thinking of emotions as natural kinds. In the case of propositional attitudes, Pérez (2005) ar-
gues in favor of considering them as natural kinds, while Sehon (1997) argues against this idea.
12 Notice that a normative kind can be applied both to humans and non-humans; in fact, it is applied to all those beings that are con-
strained in their actions by normative standards. Whether there are non-human beings in the extension of a normative kind is an open 
question (we are not trying to present a category that is a priori applied only to human beings, as Ereshefsky [2004] does). The distinc-
tion we have in mind does not pose a division of cultural or social vs. biological behaviors, but of intentionally described behaviors vs. 
a physical description of the (same?) behavior. In our view, as long as we need an intentional description of what is going on, we are no 
longer concerned with the biological realm. It is plausible to think that our normative kinds are co-extensive to Ereshefsky’s (2004) “hu-
man-made kinds”, but we believe that the label “normative kinds” makes more explicit the precise difference we find between natural 
and human-made kinds.
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2 Human behavior
As we argued in the last paragraph normative kinds 
involve normative standards within the stereotype. But it is 
not easy to see why. As we said above, the stereotype of all 
psychological concepts involves human behaviors. Hence, in 
order to find the hidden normativity we should clarify what 
we understand by “human behavior”. Trying to answer this 
question, Kim (2006) identifies three different types of events 
that are considered public behaviors, namely:
 
(i) Physiological reactions and responses: 
for example, perspiration, salivation, in-
crease in the pulse rate, increase in blood 
pressure
(ii) Bodily movements: for example, raising 
and waving a hand, opening a door, throw-
ing a baseball, a cat scratching at the door, 
a rat turning left in a T-maze
(iii) Actions involving bodily motions: for 
example, typing an invitation, greeting a 
friend, checking a book out of the library, 
going shopping, writing a check, signing a 
contract (Kim, 2006, p. 59). 
It is clear that it is possible to find an explanation in bio-
logical terms of human behaviors of type (i). But there seems 
to be solid reasons to doubt that we can find biological expla-
nations of type (iii) behaviors. Type (ii) behaviors are ambig-
uous: they can be read as cases of type (i) behaviors or as type 
(iii) cases, since “raising a hand” can be understood as (i) John’s 
hand raised (because someone else moved it, for example), or 
as (iii) John raised his hand (i.e. an intentional act ion that 
John performed). In our view there is not a third genuinely 
different type of behavior other than (i) and (iii), so in the 
rest of the paper we will be considering two types of human 
behaviors: type A behaviors, which include all physiological 
responses as well as all involuntary bodily movements, and 
type B behaviors, which include all intentional behaviors. 
Our claim is that all kinds that include type B behaviors 
in their stereotype are normative kinds, as opposed to natural 
kinds, which include only type A behaviors. In what follows 
we will argue that there are strong reasons to think that we 
cannot find biological “essences” of normative kinds.13 There 
are three reasons why biology will not suffice and why inten-
tional/psychological categories will not be replaced by purely 
biological ones. Two of them are connected with the norma-
tive charact er of type B behaviors.
In the first place we should have in mind that type B be-
haviors are intentional act ions, that is, the type of act ions that 
folk psychology – and, by extension, scientific psychology 
(following Fodor, 1987) – seeks to explain and predict. And 
according to a longstanding philosophical tradition, folk-psy-
chological categories have a sp ecial normative nature, because 
the classical explanation for human act ion comes through 
pract ical syllogism, which presupposes the rationality of the 
agent. In this line, Davidson (1970) and Dennett (1987; 
1991) consider that folk psychology (and therefore scientific 
psychology, as long as it follows the path of folk psychology) 
is constituted by normative principles, such as the principle of 
charity or the principle of rationality. This normative charac-
ter, which governs the use of psychological concepts, is pre-
cisely what prevents (as argued by Davidson, 1970; 1973) the 
formulation of genuine causal laws involving psychological 
states and thus any attempt to reduce psychology to the nat-
ural sciences. As Davidson (1973) says, “detailed knowledge 
of the physics or physiology of the brain, indeed of the whole 
man, would not provide a shortcut to the kind of interpreta-
tion required for the application of sophisticated psychologi-
cal concepts” (Davidson, 1973, p. 258), including among them 
“intention, belief, […] desire, […] act ion, decision, memory, 
perception, learning, wanting, attending, noticing, and many 
others” (Davidson, 1973, p. 246). Assuming a similar view, 
Graham (2010) defines mental disorders in terms of a “dis-
ability, incapacity or impairment in the rational or reason-re-
sponsive operation or exercise of one or more fundamental 
mental faculties or basic psychological capacities of a person” 
(Graham, 2010, p. 156), arguing that because of this presup-
posed rationality and values, they cannot be reduced to brain 
disorders (Graham, 2010).
Secondly, it is important to notice that even those who 
deny the normative charact er of folk psychology but accept 
the functionalist thesis – as all cognitive scientists do – that 
proposes the multiple realizability of mental states also hold 
that psychological laws cannot be reduced to (that is, they 
are not able to be rewritten in terms of) the neurophysiolog-
ical realizators of these mental states, given the existence of 
normal conditions (or ceteris paribus clauses) in psychological 
laws, that prevent their reduction to biological ones (Fodor, 
1974; 1987; 1991). In sum, even those who argue that it is 
possible to find scientific (causal) laws that link psychological 
states with behaviors do not believe that these laws can be 
rewritten in biological terms.
In the third place, it is important to point out that, in the 
case of scientific laws that involve type B behaviors, the deter-
mination of which behaviors are considered “normal” (that is, 
how the “normal conditions” are determined) does not de-
pend upon statistical analyses. On the contrary, the behaviors 
that are considered “normal” are the expected behaviors in 
the context of the social norms est ablished by the culture / 
society in which the individual is immersed (for example, it is 
considered an abnormal behavior for a school child not being 
seated on a chair for eight hours a day as educational policies 
prescribe). In other words, in the case of type A behaviors, it is 
very clear what it means to consider them as “abnormal” (e.g. 
the rising of the heart rate or the pulse above a certain level), 
13 By “biological essences” we mean purely neuro, endocrino and/or genetic facts that explain the stereotype features of that kind.
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because these are behaviors that conspire against the health 
of the individual. But that is not clearly the case concerning 
type B behaviors (e.g. if we think about homosexual behaviors, 
to give an example of something that at some point in our 
cultural history – not very long ago – was considered a dis-
ease); it seems that they are “abnormal” in another sense. The 
fact that they are considered “abnormal” by a certain society 
at a certain moment is related to the values  and pract ices that 
are approved or disapproved by that society, not to their rel-
evance to the health of the individual.14 The explanation of 
this kind of behaviors requires more than just biological facts. 
In sum, it is not clear that there are laws involving type B 
behaviors. If such laws existed, it is not clear either that they 
could be reduced to laws involving internal states of the sub-
ject couched in non-psychological terms (that is, in biologi-
cal, neurophysiological, chemical, genetic or hormonal terms, 
etc.). There are good reasons to think that the “essences” of 
psychological states cannot be wholly formulated (unlike the 
“essence” of water) in terms of another (more basic) scientif-
ic discipline. And finally, even if there were laws that might 
be statistically representative of the typical act ions of human 
individuals, there is no guarantee that such statistical general-
ization does not hide norms, values  and social pract ices that 
do not depend upon the biology of the subjects, but are the 
result of the actual history of the society / culture in which 
individuals are immersed.
3 Autism Spectrum Disorder: 
A study case
In this section we will take a look at a paradigmatic psy-
chological/psychiatric concept: “Autism Spectrum Disorder” 
(ASD). The diagnostic criteria for mental disorders such as 
this are, usually, type B behaviors. In this section we will an-
alyze the strategies used in biomedical research in order to 
find sp ecific etiologies (“essences”) to explain such disorders. 
We will argue that these research programs are inconclusive 
and that the lack of biomarkers that are clinically useful for 
refining the diagnoses is due to the fact that, unlike in certain 
neuropathologies, there are no physiological essences that can 
fully explain ASD symptoms. In our view, as we are dealing 
with type B behaviors as part of the stereotype for ASD, we 
had better interpret this mental disorder as a normative kind.
In the previous paragraphs we pointed out that we could 
find biological causal agents for diseases whose symptoms (or 
diagnostic criteria) are type A behaviors. In this regard, we 
described why dengue might be interpreted as a natural kind. 
We can also extend this label to certain diseases that concern 
the brain, such as meningitis. Such diseases – dengue and 
meningitis – are caused by a sp ecific external agent (a virus, a 
bact erium, or a toxic substance), which precedes and triggers 
the symptoms (fever, headache).
There are also some neurocognitive disorders that have 
sp ecific anomalies in certain areas as brain correlates. For ex-
ample, in Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases a sp ecific phys-
ical deterioration is observed as a predecessor of cognitive 
deficits.15 In general, neurodegenerative diseases represent a 
sp ectrum charact erized by the accumulation of certain pro-
teins, which form aggregates and precipitate in certain neu-
ronal populations, and are subdivided on the basis of clinical 
presentation, deposition of the protein and cellular and sub-
cellular pathology (Brett & Kearney, 2017). In other words, 
these diseases are triggered by sp ecific internal factors. In this 
sense, they count as natural kinds because there is a biologi-
cal explanation for some type A behaviors that constitute the 
stereotype, for example the tremors that are charact eristic 
consequences of the progressive neuronal deterioration that 
accompanies Parkinson’s disease. 
In our opinion, the cases mentioned above are examples 
of natural kinds; the stereotype includes type A behaviors (fe-
ver, headache, tremors) that can be explained by an essence 
which can be completely described in biological terms, either 
by external factors, as in the case of meningitis, or by internal 
factors, such as the protein aggregate that is charact eristic of 
neurodegenerative diseases. Moreover, if the stereotype re-
tains, from its charact erization prior to the discovery of the 
biological “essence”, type B behaviors such as memory loss (a 
cognitive deficit), that is because memory loss is directly asso-
ciated with a sp ecific physiological deterioration that precedes 
and triggers it, affecting the functions of certain neuronal pop-
ulations on which these impaired cognitive functions depend.
In contrast, mental disorders – so called because their 
sp ecific triggering agents are unknown – do not seem to be 
diagnosed in relation to type A behaviors. In these cases, there 
are no precise symptoms such as fever, headache, or tremors. 
Even cognitive deficits such as those associated with biological 
dysfunctions – for example, memory loss – do not appear to 
be present. On the contrary, we cannot do anything but to ap-
peal to type B behaviors in order to diagnose these disorders. 
But interpreting them as natural kinds implies that we will be 
able to find behind type B behaviors a biological causal agent 
14 It is not even clear that it is statistically “abnormal” to carry out homosexual behaviors (nor is it clear enough what behaviors should 
exactly count as “homosexual”). There are no reliable statistics (to our knowledge) regarding how common homosexual behavior is in 
our society, and even if it were true that it represents a minority in statistical terms, it would not be clear that its statistically low presence 
is not the result of negative social pressures that these behaviors usually receive, as opposed to their being based on facts about our 
biology. (Notice that we are talking about “homosexual behaviors”, not about gender identity.)
15 DSM-4 classified them as Alzheimer’s dementia and dementia due to Parkinson’s disease. But they have been reclassified in DSM-5 
as neurocognitive disorder (NCD) due to Alzheimer’s disease and neurocognitive disorder due to Parkinson’s disease. The change is 
due, in part, to the fact that, although it is not understood how the deterioration of cognitive functions is triggered, there is a concrete 
physical deterioration.
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capable of explaining them, and we have called into question 
this possibility in the previous section.
Given that sp ecific etiologies for mental disorders are 
not known, there are no blood tests or similar diagnostic 
methods; therefore, the diagnosis is based on behavioral ob-
servation (and self-report). In order to create a unified cri-
terion, there are reference diagnostic frameworks. The two 
broadly accepted ones are the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual (DSM) edited by the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) 
approved by the World Health Organization. The descriptive 
persp ective they assume raises the need to develop new the-
oretical and etiological approaches in order to validate these 
diagnostic criteria (Tsou, 2016).16 New classification propos-
als that incorporate biomarkers as an objective condition for 
disorders have become the new scientific challenge for the up-
coming DSM and ICD updates (Lord & Jones, 2012); howev-
er, there is skepticism regarding this project (Hyman, 2014). 
In what follows we will analyze, as a paradigmatic ex-
ample, the Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). It is a paradig-
matic case due to its great interindividual variability. In effect, 
the word “sp ectrum” in this kind of cases refers to the high 
heterogeneity that usually charact erizes the presentation of 
clinical cases.
The description made by DSM-5 for ASD is based on 
two central criteria, both of which include type B behaviors. 
Criterion A includes persistent deficits in social communica-
tion and social interact ion, and criterion B includes restricted 
and/or repetitive patterns of behavior, interests or act ivities. 
It is interesting to note that the latest update of DSM incor-
porated two new diagnostic labels: Disorder in Social Com-
munication (SCD), for those people who only meet criteri-
on A, and Disorder of Stereotyped Movement (SMD) for 
those who only manifest criterion B. Although both criteria 
can coexist by coincidence in an individual, ASD, SCD and 
SMD are considered as three different disorders because it is 
assumed that each of them has a charact eristic and different 
etiology. For this reason, ASD has not been replaced by SCD 
plus SMD. That is, both criteria would be present in ASD, 
but due to a different sp ecific etiology (Inui et al., 2017, p. 2).
As we will show in detail below, it has not yet been 
demonstrated that there is a causal relationship between the 
physiological correlations that have been associated with au-
tistic behaviors and people who have been diagnosed with this 
disorder. In other words, despite great efforts to find a sp ecific 
etiology triggering ASD, a biological “essence” that might ex-
plain the stereotype has not been found yet. We will review 
the main initiatives that have been developed to find the bio-
logical “essence” of ASD and the difficulties that such studies 
have had; the first one involves the search for sp ecific genes, 
while the second focuses its efforts on trying to find sp ecif-
ic brain structures and neuronal act ivation patterns. We are 
aware that we do not have a knockdown argument because 
it will always be possible to argue that more time is needed 
in order for these research programs to find the results they 
are looking for. But the failure in these cases, along with the 
fact that with the same technologies in other fields – such as 
neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s 
– these research programs were successful, plus the a priori 
arguments we made in the previous section about the difficul-
ties of understanding in biological terms some sp ecific behav-
iors (type B), leads us to suggest that we had better think of 
these behavioral patterns as revealing normative kinds.  
3.1 Searching for genetic “essences”
In order to find the molecular mechanisms that cause 
ASD, numerous lines of research were looking for anomalies, 
both at the genomic and cerebral levels, comparing “control” 
subjects with those who were diagnosed with ASD. Given the 
fact that all these studies only include a small number of clin-
ical cases, several initiatives have emerged which concentrate 
the data that has been obtained from those studies, increasing 
their statistical power. Psychiatric disorders are charact er-
ized by high comorbidity. For this reason, the Cross-Disor-
der Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium (PGC) 
used genome-wide genotype data from case-control groups 
for schizophrenia (SZ), bipolar disorder (BP), major depres-
sive disorder (MDD), autism sp ectrum disorders (ASD) and 
attention-deficit / hyperact ivity disorder (ADHD) in order 
to examine the genetic etiology shared by such disorders 
(Docherty et al., 2016, p. 3). Mental disorders are also char-
act eristically polygenic. That is, in each disorder there will be 
thousands of genes involved, each one having a very small ef-
fect. In this sense, the predominant hypothesis to explain co-
morbidity is that there may be genetic overlaps between two 
disorders, resulting in a pleiotropy that would explain why a 
person might be diagnosed with two disorders (ibid., p. 2). In 
the same direction, the National Institute of Mental Health 
(NIMH) launched the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) 
project, which aims to “understand the nature of mental 
health and illness in terms of varying degrees of dysfunctions 
16 Although Tsou considers that certain disorders described in DSM are not natural kinds, he affirms the existence of others that are, such 
as schizophrenia and depression (Tsou, 2016). His criterion to distinguish disorders that would actually count as natural kinds from those 
that are not does not depend, as we suggest, on the presence of type B behaviors in the stereotype, but on the possibility of discovering 
underlying biological mechanisms that account for the stereotype. But currently there are no biomarkers with clinical application for 
mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, contrary to what Tsou suggests. It is still a project under development to increase the statistical 
power of the information available about persons diagnosed with schizophrenia in order to find biomarkers that are clinically useful 
(see https://www.natureindex.com/institution-outputs/united-states-of-america-usa/international-schizophrenia-consortium-isc/537ab-
da2140ba03066000008, as well as the Cognitive Neuroscience Treatment Research to Improve Cognition in Schizophrenia, based on 
the search for cognitive and imaging biomarkers, http://cntrics.ucdavis.edu/).
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in general psychological / biological systems”.17 A database 
was created for this purpose, integrating information at many 
levels: from genomics, through neuronal circuits, to behavior 
and self-report. Numerous studies have compared the ge-
nomes of people diagnosed with ASD, finding variants in the 
number of gene copies [CNVs], as well as rare single-nucleo-
tide variants (SNVs), both inherited and de novo (not present 
in either parent). However, the heterogeneity of clinical cases 
has an impact on the genetic studies; there is a multiplicity of 
genetic patterns that have been associated with ASD, in addi-
tion to the lack of sp ecificity of the genes supposedly involved 
(overlapping with other disorders) (Lord & Jones, 2012, p. 2). 
In addition, the supposed genetic risk factors found for ASD 
can be found in the general population, that is, in people who 
have not manifest ed any psychiatric symptoms (Robinson 
et al., 2016). Moreover, the classic studies in twins analyzing 
inheritance are not univocal. In fact, there are works that 
suggest that the inheritance of ASD would be approximate-
ly 38%, while shared environmental factors would influence 
58% (Goldani et al., 2014, p. 2). In this case it was concluded 
that the epigenetic factors were predominant.18 A more re-
cent large population-based epidemiological study of roughly 
2.5 million families seems to have provided clear evidence for 
a genetic component of ASD, estimating the disease’s herita-
bility at around 50% to 95%, making it one of the most her-
itable of neuropsychiatric disorders. Nevertheless, in all these 
studies, the phenotypic concordance between monozygotic 
twins is incomplete, indicating that nongenetic environmen-
tal factors do play a role in the etiology of ASD (Chahrour et 
al., 2017, p. 335). 
Given the results mentioned so far, we think that there 
are reasons to cast a doubt on the idea that there is a genetic 
essence for ASD. In the first place, we would like to emphasize 
that epigenetic factors, even if they have a clear influence, are 
never considered as the main causal factor. They are usually 
interpreted in a biological way – as the gene “environment” – 
resulting in an “autistic phenotype”.19 But, in our view, given 
the fact that epigenetics incorporates non-biological factors 
(Fine et al., 2017), both genes and epigenetic factors broadly 
constructed – and not genes alone – are the emergence base 
of what we prefer to call the “autistic stereotype” (instead of 
“autistic phenotype”). 
Secondly, it is not clear that ASD is caused by genetic 
mutations. SNVs arise in more than one form in the popu-
lation and these different forms are not signs of either disor-
der or dysfunction, but they simply reflect natural variation 
(Baron-Cohen, 2017, p. 744). In addition, the presence of rare 
genetic mutations that could cause severe dysfunctions was 
not found in people diagnosed with autism (ibid.). Moreover, 
as Chahrour affirms, “although the overall burden of de novo 
CNVs is higher in affected than in unaffected individuals, 
many of the same CNVs also occur in the unaffected individ-
uals, making it difficult to determine which changes are likely 
to be disease-causing. The heterogeneity of CNV-associated 
phenotypes can also be manifest ed within a single family as 
a result of unidentified modifiers” (Chahrour, 2017, p. 336). 
The majority of CNVs have very low recurrence in ASD, and 
a sp ecific CNV can often be unique to a single patient (ibid.). 
Indeed, it has been found that de novo mutations collectively 
explain less than 5% of overall ASD liability, which leads to 
the conclusion that “almost all genetic risk factors for ASDs 
can be found in unaffected individuals. For example, most 
people who carry 16p11.2 deletion, the most common large 
mutational risk factor for ASDs, do not meet criteria for an 
ASD diagnosis” (Robinson et al., 2016, p. 2). 
Finally, if both the genetic factors and the proposed epi-
genetic factors do not result in an univocal phenotype, it is 
necessary to call into question the idea of an “autistic pheno-
type”, which presumes the existence of biological mechanisms 
underlying the behaviors labeled as autistic. Instead, we pro-
pose that the heterogeneity of clinical cases shows that type B 
behaviors are not susceptible to being rewritten in biological 
terms. The lack of phenotypic concordance, even between 
monozygotic twins, works as a strong evidence that supports 
our proposal. In the light of all these findings, there are reasons 
to think that a genetic “essence” for ASD will never be found. 
3.2 Searching for “essences” in the 
architecture and functioning of the brain
Autism Brain Imaging Data Exchange (ABIDE) is the 
main project devoted to the study of the architecture and 
functioning of the brain in people with ASD. Its goal is to en-
hance the scope of brain connectomics research in Autism 
Spectrum Disorder.20 There is plenty of evidence of abnor-
mal neuronal connectivity in people with ASD (Di Martino 
et al., 2017). In this sense, non-invasive brain imaging tech-
niques seem to offer a great promise for discovering patterns 
in brain structures and functioning that could be used as ob-
jective measures of this mental disorder. Among such tech-
niques, R-fMRI is presented as the key candidate to define 
functional neurophenotypes (ibid.). The ABIDE I initiative, 
launched in 2012, was the first to enable a site of free access 
17 https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/index.shtml.
18 Epigenetics refers to how the environment, which includes our practices and lifestyle, impacts on the expression of our genes.
19 We would like to emphasize that the term “phenotype”, widely used in scientific literature to refer to behaviors labeled as autistic, 
implies per se an understanding of such behaviors in biological terms, because this concept refers to the visible characteristics of an 
individual – such as eye color – resulting from his genetic constitution and the interaction with the environment. We use quotation marks 
in order to stress that it seems doubtful to talk about phenotypic type B behaviors.
20 http://fcon_1000.projects.nitrc.org/indi/abide/.
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to brain images obtained through functional magnetic reso-
nance in resting state (R-fMRI) of the connectome of people 
with ASD. Collecting data from different research centers, 
it reached an N = 539 and N = 573 for people diagnosed 
with ASD and controls, resp ectively. To increase the size of 
the sample and to help discover the neuronal correlations in 
people diagnosed with autism, an ABIDE II provided a new 
data source, adding a N = 487 for people with ASD and a N 
= 557 of control subjects (Di Martino et al., 2017, p. 2). Two 
sources of heterogeneity present in ABIDE I would make 
ABIDE II a more reliable source. First, it analyzes the disor-
ders that co-occur with ASD (comorbidity), something that 
has been largely ignored in the neuroimaging field. In this 
sense, ABIDE II act ively encouraged researchers to provide 
phenotypic information regarding co-occurring illnesses, if 
assessed (ibid.). This is in tune with the initiatives described 
above regarding genomic comparisons between different 
disorders to analyze comorbidity. Secondly, ABIDE II con-
siders sex bias due to the prevalence of ASD in men. This 
causes women to be excluded, or minimally represented, in 
studies. For this reason, from N = 65 for women with ASD 
in ABIDE I, ABIDE II has increased it to N = 138 when I 
and II are combined. This increase would facilitate finding 
risk and protection factors sp ecific to the sexes, providing 
information about the molecular mechanisms underlying 
ASD (ibid.).21 
In relation to neuronal correlates based on the reposito-
ry available in ABIDE, one study used R-fMRI in 697 partic-
ipants to detect useful biomarkers with clinical applications. 
It is important to note that the total number of participants 
resulted from the exclusion of those who did not meet the 
diagnostic criteria used by that particular study. ABIDE data 
comes from multiple simple study sites, each study having 
its own methodology and involving variables that limit the 
validity of grouping data in a common study. We emphasize 
this fact because, in general, the heterogeneity between the 
experimental procedures of each study presents a challenge 
for research that aim to develop brain markers for psychiatric 
disorders. The most common variables range from MRI ac-
quisition protocols (e. g. scanner type, imaging sequence) to 
participant instructions (e. g. eyes open vs. closed) to recruit-
ment strategies (age-group, IQ-range, level of impairment, 
treatment history and acceptable comorbidities) (Abraham 
et al., 2016, p. 2).
According to the results of this study, a 67% prediction 
was obtained, the largest one predicted from ABIDE (Abra-
ham et al., 2016, p. 9). The predictions were based on the 
intrinsic functional connectivity of three functional systems 
that have been noted as having a decreased connectivity in 
people with ASD (Abraham et al., 2016, p. 10). However, 
even if there are such correlations, it is not clear that we are 
dealing with a causal/explanatory biological essence of the 
symptoms (the ASD stereotype). An evidence for our claim 
is that no biomarkers have been found for any mental disor-
der that, in contrast with neuropathologies such as Alzhei-
mer’s and Parkinson’s, is charact erized by not having sp ecif-
ic phenotypes.22  In this sense, the need to find “candidate 
biomarkers” from which to refine the diagnosis is hampered 
by the heterogeneity that charact erizes the clinical cases of 
psychiatric disorders. This fact is esp ecially clear in ASD, in 
which case, despite having a vast amount of scientific litera-
ture that describes it in fundamentally biological terms, we 
have no biomarkers of clinical utility for its detection (Bar-
giela et al., 2016, p. 3292).
At this point it is important to remark that some au-
thors suggest that ASD is not a disorder, i.e. something that 
would need treatment. Instead, they have charact erized it 
as a different way of functioning, a “cognitive style” (Happé, 
1999), due to “neurodiversity” (Baron-Cohen, 2017), and not 
as a dysfunction. This is because people diagnosed with ASD 
are sometimes better than average people in certain cognitive 
domains, such as attention to details, memory for details, the 
ability to detect patterns or to systematize them (Baron-Co-
hen, 2017, p 744). Moreover, Baron-Cohen argues that
Autism is not alone in DSM-5 in being called 
a disorder. Since DSM-1 in 1952, when there 
were 106 disorders listed, there has been a 
steady increase, and when DSM-5 was pub-
lished in 2013, the number had reached 
300. It is unlikely that DSM really ‘carves 
nature at its joints’, as Plato recommend-
ed our best classificatory and explanatory 
theories should, if we can keep adding or 
subtracting diagnostic categories each time 
a new edition of DSM is published. Recall 
how homosexuality was classified as a dis-
order in DSM-I and DSM-II, until civil rights 
protests succeeded in having it declassified 
from DSM-III in 1980, on the grounds that it 
is just a natural example of the diversity of 
sexual orientations that exist in any popula-
tion (Baron-Cohen, 2017, p. 744).
As we can see, there are authorized voices that have put 
into doubt the idea that DSM includes only natural kinds. 
However, the notions of cognitive style and neurodiversity 
are still interpreted as functional differences due to different 
21 We do not accept the idea that the existence of a prevalence in one or the other sex legitimizes the view that there is a biological 
origin that explains ASD. We suggest that there are other possible interpretations of this prevalence that include both the gender bias 
in the diagnosis and the gender bias in the research studies, but developing this suggestion is beyond the scope of this paper.
22 Although there are currently no biomarkers that can be used in the clinic to predict Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases before neu-
ronal deterioration begins to appear, a great advance has been made in finding proteins and specific candidate genes associated with 
this deterioration (Redensek et al., 2018; Shui et al., 2017).
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biological constitutions. That is, it is assumed that genetic 
variables and different brain structures and functions are 
the causal agents of the “autistic phenotype”, only question-
ing their labeling as “anomalous”. In short, the discussions are 
either about which ones are to be considered disorders or 
not (Happe, 1999; Baron-Cohen, 2017), or which ones are 
susceptible or not to be categorized as natural kinds (Tsou, 
2016). However, the validity of assigning biological essences 
to psychological categorizations whose stereotype includes 
type B behavior, whatever they are, interpreting them in 
terms of phenotype, is not questioned.23 Our proposal is, in 
this sense, more radical: where we have type B behavior as 
part of the stereotype of a given kind it would be impossible 
to find a purely biological explanation. 
4 Conclusion
As we said in the previous paragraph, type B behaviors 
are used in order to classify mental disorders and cognitive 
styles. But the labels proposed have changed in short periods 
of time, some of them were corrected, others added, some 
deleted, some considered sometimes as identifying diseases 
and sometimes only as identifying different lifestyle patterns. 
As we said in paragraph 2, we hold that those categories that 
involve type B behaviors in their stereotypes should not be 
considered as natural kinds, and hence we should not look for 
their biological “essence”. On the contrary, we should consid-
er them as normative kinds and acknowledge that there will 
always be normative standards involved in these categories, 
which rule out the idea of finding a purely biological essence 
for them.  It is apparent that our experiences, the habits we 
acquired, the abilities we learn in our lives are incorporated 
into our neuronal wiring and affect the expression of our 
genes, our brain architecture and our neural circuits. The 
uniqueness of our brains transcends the normative catego-
ries created to describe them. We propose this form of rein-
terpretation in the case of ASD because it is a paradigmatic 
case: exceptions are the rule in relation to the diagnostic cri-
teria described by DSM, and several voices have been raised 
against the very idea of autism being a mental disorder. In our 
view, a diagnosis based on type B behaviors involves norma-
tive ideals to which the real behaviors of the diagnosed people 
are then adjusted. In this sense we hope that the distinction 
between normative kinds and natural kinds will contribute 
to the proper treatment of these types of cases, highlighting 
that more reflection about the social pract ices in which we 
are involved is needed. 
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